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I. BACKGROUND OF THE EMBARGO AND HELMS-BURTON
The Cuban Embargo, as we know it, was enacted as an executive order 
on February 7, 1962, at the direction of President Kennedy.1 Despite significant 
popular pressure in the United States to terminate the Embargo, equally
fervent pressure to strengthen its terms helped keep the Embargo in place 
for over 53 years, under nine different Administrations.2  An embargo is 
a diplomatic trade ban that partially or completely prohibits commerce 
and trade with a particular target country.3 The Trading with the Enemy 
Act, which provides the basis for the Cuban Embargo, effectively gives the
President the power to put in place and maintain economic sanctions 
against hostile nations.4 The objective of the Embargo, insofar as it concerned 
Cuba, was to undermine and oust the strict and oppressive control of the 
regime under Fidel Castro by denying the Castro regime the proceeds and 
profits from trade of its products with the United States and financial 
transactions with the international community at large.5  Rather than act 
as a catalyst to accelerate the downfall of the Castro regime, the Embargo 
had the opposite effect: with the Embargo in place, Castro always had a 
viable scapegoat for any problem in Cuba. In fact, the irony of the Embargo 
1. See Proclamation 3447—Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, 76 Stat. 1446 (1962) 
(prohibiting the importation of all goods of Cuban origin, all goods imported from or through
Cuba to the U.S., and all exports from the U.S. to Cuba with the right to modify or revoke 
exceptions reserved exclusively to President Kennedy).
2. Although, in 1977, President Jimmy Carter temporarily allowed U.S. citizens 
to travel to Cuba and chose not to renew the ban on travel to Cuba, which was renewable 
every six months. However, when President Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 
1981, the Cuba travel ban was reinstated, economic pressure was tightened, and Cuba was 
placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. See Merrill Fabry, The U.S. Trade
Embargo on Cuba Just Hit 55 Years, TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 19, 2015, http://time.com/
4076438/us-cuba-embargo-1960/ [https://perma.cc/9WWK-2T88]. See also John Suarez, 
President Obama’s retread of Jimmy Carter’s 1970’s U.S. Cuba Policy, CUBAN EXILE
QUARTER (Feb. 6, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://cubanexilequarter.blogspot.com/2015/02/
president-obamas-plagiarism-of-jimmy.html [https://perma.cc/K24J-5FLA] (noting that while 
President Jimmy Carter chose not to renew the travel ban to Cuba, President Ronald Reagan
reinstated the prohibition in 1981, among other stringent policies against Cuba).
3. See Economic Embargo of Cuba Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, http:// 
definitions.uslegal.com/e/economic-embargo-of-cuba/ [https://perma.cc/58AF-SARL] (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
4. See generally Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. § 5 (2006) (noting
that a President in time of war may, through any agency that he may designate, and under 
such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise
investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange with an ally of an
enemy).
5. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1997); see also 
United States Department of Treasury, Comment on the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
Title 31 Part 515 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (July 26, 2001), https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tab4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES6Q-YBEH]. 
326
    
  




















   
   







   
  






EISELMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/2017 10:38 AM 
[VOL. 18:  325, 2017] Cuba Libre
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
is that, for all intents and purposes, Castro needed the Embargo in order
to consolidate his influence and power.
By 1995, the general sentiment was that President Clinton would terminate
the Embargo and reestablish diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.6  At 
that time, however, Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton 
had proposed legislation that would strengthen the Embargo and, among
other things, facilitate Cuban independence; however, the proposed legislation,
known as the Helms-Burton Act, was losing momentum, and could not
trump the ability of President Clinton to terminate the Embargo and render 
the legislation moot.7 
On February 24, 1996, an international incident occurred that changed
the complexion of the circumstances. On that day, the Cuban Air Force 
downed two American civilian airplanes in international waters, killing 
four people.8 Members of a Florida-based group of Cuban exiles who 
called themselves “Brothers to the Rescue” operated the American airplanes 
to assist Cubans attempting to immigrate to the United States.9 The group 
had been warned previously about the dangers of entering Cuban air 
space, as the missions they flew regularly violated Cuban air space.10 The 
6. See Peter Kornbluh & William M. Leogrande, The Real Reason It’s Nearly Impossible 
to End the Cuba Embargo, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 5, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2014/10/the-1996-incident-that-made-it-nearly-impossible-to-repeal­
the-cuba-embargo/381107/ [https://perma.cc/2A2V-3PJ5].
7. See generally CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT 
OF 1995, H.R REP. NO.104-202, pt.1 (1st Sess. 1995). 
8.  Carl Nagin, Backfire, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 1998, at 30. 
9. Brothers to the Rescue’s humanitarian mission was aimed to provide assistance 
to emigrants from Cuba trying to use whatever means possible to escape the Castro regime
and come to the United States. However, this group regularly exceeded the scope of their
role, and often brazenly buzzed Cuban air space and even dropped pamphlets upon the
streets of Havana. See Larry Rohter, Exiles Say Cuba Downed 2 Planes and Clinton Expresses 
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/25/world/exiles­
say-cuba-downed-2-planes-and-clinton-expresses-outrage.html?mtrref=topics.nytimes.com& 
gwh=ACAB5ED398A823A271749CD1FA0290E0&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/PQ5H­
U337]; see also BROTHERS TO THE RESCUE BACKGROUND INFORMATION, http://www.
hermanos.org/Background%20and%20Information.htm [https://perma.cc/JTH3-ZDC8] (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
10. Both planes had communicated with Cuban air traffic controllers via radio, identified 
themselves, and reported their intentions to search international waters for Cuban refugees
who may be on rafts. U.S. Civilian Planes Shot Down Near Cuba, CNN (Feb. 24, 1996, 
12:45 AM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9602/cuba_shootdown/25/ [https://perma.cc/2P7H­
VEWT]; Alfonso Chardy, Expert: Brothers has previously ignored warnings about 
airspace, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 1, 2001, http://www.cubanet.org/htdocs///CNews/y01/mar01/
01e4.htm [https://perma.cc/K3WD-S9LB].
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downing of these planes was apparently on the orders of Fidel Castro, who 
was outraged that these missions also involved dropping pamphlets and
other propaganda in Cuba thereby violating Cuban airspace.11 
All bets for an end to the Embargo were off.  Outrage over the deaths 
of three American citizens and one permanent Florida resident increased
antagonism toward the Castro regime and forced the Clinton Administration
to alter its policy towards Cuba permanently.12 The Embargo was more
stringently enforced, and the Helms-Burton legislation that was seemingly
dead in the water started to gain momentum, and once the death of these 
American pilots came to light, President Clinton was compelled to undertake 
some actions against the Castro regime and signed the Act into law on 
March 12, 1966.13 
In response to the Brothers to the Rescue incident, President Clinton
signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) 
Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act).14 The Helms-Burton Act was created as 
a means to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government 
in Cuba and to support a transition government leading to a democratically 
elected government in Cuba.15 Congress determined “[t]he repression of
the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections,
and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the 
Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the 
Western Hemisphere.”16 The Helms-Burton Act aimed to encourage the
holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba by increasing economic 
pressure on the Castro regime; however, in strengthening the Embargo 
and ceasing trade and relief to a country in need, the Cuban regime was 
even further isolated. During his last days in office, President Clinton 
reflected on Cuban relations and expressed his thoughts on the Helms-
Burton Act and how he believed it was a mistake attributed to a hasty 
emotional response to the Cuban attack on the Brothers to the Rescue
airplanes.17
 11. See Clinton Delays Implementation of Bill on Cuba Lawsuits: U.S. Moves to Ban 
Canadian Executives, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, July 18, 1996, at A2. 
 12. Nagin, supra note 8; see Todd Purdum, Clinton Seeking Wider Sanctions Against
Cubans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/27/world/clinton­
seeking-wider-sanctions-against-cubans.html?mtrref=topics.nytimes.com&gwh=0E423 
7F879BD28B40EFAE21A9EAF4409&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/83GF-M334].
13. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C §§ 
6021–6029 (2006). 
14. Id. § 6046(b). 
15. Id. § 6022. 
16. Id. § 6021. 
17. See Andrew Rosell, Comment, The Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations, a Policy Shift
from the Helms-Burton Act, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 235, 242 (2001). 
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Nevertheless, the Helms-Burton Act still governs U.S. relations with 
Cuba, and has had a notable impact upon the Cuban economy that has had
the net effect of negatively impacting the people it was enacted to help, 
while assisting the elite dictators that it was enacted to overthrow.18  For
example, eighty percent of Cuban sugar was exported to the Soviet Union 
during the 1980s, and since its collapse, Cuba has been incapable of expanding 
its economy from being largely dependent on sugar production.19  The
impact of the Helms-Burton Act has rendered Cuba unable to stand on its 
own two feet economically, and has left the citizens of Cuba completely 
dependent upon a dictator whose position is actually secured by a more
stringent economic embargo, rather than weakened by it in view of the
fact that, with the Embargo, Castro has a continuous scapegoat for Cuba’s
plight.20 
This Article examines the nature of the history and origins of hostilities 
between the United States and Cuba leading up to the Embargo, and the
Constitutional issue regarding the possible termination of the Embargo in 
view of the Helms-Burton Act. While President Kennedy enacted the Embargo 
unilaterally, the Helms-Burton Act usurped the power to regulate and
conduct international affairs from the President, requiring a two-thirds 
Senate majority in order to lift or modify the Embargo.21 Arguably, this
provision violates both the United States Constitution as well as International
Law.22 Under the Obama Administration there was a new attitude towards 
Cuba, but the Embargo remains in place.23 This Article will address political
and economic aspects of the Embargo and will examine the various interests
in enforcing the Embargo on the part of both the United States and its
18. With the termination of subsidies from Russia and the sharp decline in export
trade resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cuban economy has been
unable to recover, and its population, not the Castro regime, ended up suffering the greater
burden. See U.S. Embargo Hurting Cuba’s Health, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at A16. 
 19. Lucien Dhooge, Fiddling With Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 575, 588 (1997). 
20. See Kornbluh and Leogrande, supra note 6.
 21. Luisette Gierbolini, The Helms-Burton Act: Inconsistency with International Law 
and Irrationality at Their Maximum, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289, 292 (1997). 
22. Id.; see Jose Gabliondo, Can Obama Unilaterally End the Cuba Embargo, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2015, 1:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose­
gabilondo/can-obama-end-longtime-cuba-embargo_b_8059762.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2A67-7V83].
23. See Scott Lincicome, Yes, of Course We Should Lift the Cuban Embargo, THE 
FEDERALIST (Dec. 23, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/12/23/yes-of-course-we-should­
lift-the-cuban-embargo/ [https://perma.cc/2XAZ-L8T3]. 
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impact upon Cuba. As a tool of United States foreign policy, the Embargo
actually enhances the Castro government’s authority by giving it a convenient 
justification for the economic failures of socialism under the Castro regime.24 
Since its inception, the Embargo has failed to influence any change on the
structure of the Cuban Government. The Embargo that was designed to
bring an end to the Castro regime is the very thing that has empowered it 
over the course of decades.
II. FAILURE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF HELM-BURTON
The objective of the Helms-Burton Act was to increase the pressure on 
the Cuban government by restricting assistance from countries that would
provide aid to Cuba, as well as forcing neutral foreign countries choose 
between trading with Cuba at the expense of doing any type of business 
with the United States.25 Cuba has nonetheless remained connected to the
rest of the world, as the Act has been ineffective in forcing countries to 
choose a side and alienating Cuba from all international commerce.26  In
2013, Cuba exported $2.3 billion to, and imported $4.8 billion from, its 
top trading partner, Venezuela.27 Any argument that the Embargo somehow
isolates the Cuban regime from anyone other than American travelers,
exporters, and consumers is contrary to the empirical data available about 
Cuban trade.28 
Poorly designed legislative sanctions concerning the Cuban Embargo 
have been easily bypassed in recent years. Despite the Embargo, the United 
States has become Cuba’s fifth-largest trading partner since 2007, increased 
in part by President George W. Bush’s decision to reauthorize the export 
24. Daniel Griswold, The US Embargo of Cuba is a Failure, THE GUARDIAN (June
15, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jun/15/cuba-us­
trade-embargo-obama [https://perma.cc/96US-9V96]. 
25. “The Helms-Burton Act permits the exclusion of foreign persons from the
United States and makes U.S. nationals and foreign persons liable in U.S. federal courts if
they are knowingly and intentionally: (i) trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban
government; and (ii) the property belongs to a U.S. national who does not consent to the 
use of his or its property.” See Saturnino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995: An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
325, 340–41 (1996). 
26. See Jorge I. Dominguez, What You Might Not Know About the Cuban Economy, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 17, 2015) https://hbr.org/2015/08/what-you-might-not-know-about­
the-cuban-economy [https://perma.cc/BS8X-B3W7] (discussing how Cuba exported $343
million in 2013 to China and imported $1.5 billion from it, but, in contrast, exported $81
million to and imported $614 million from Brazil.”).
27. Id.
 28. See Lincicome, supra note 23, (discussing how Cuba has access to internationally
traded currencies like Euros, Canadian Dollars, and Yen, and that Cuba is also a full
member of the World Trade Organization). 
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of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba during 2003.29  President Bush authorized 
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba in late-2001 under presidential discretion, 
and sales of these exports have exceeded $5 billion between 2002 and 
2014.30 In 2014, according to the Census Bureau, the U.S. exported nearly
$300 million worth of products to Cuba, and over $700 million in 2007 
alone.31 The highest volume American exports have been concentrated in
the agricultural and telecommunications industries.32  Since the Obama 
Administration’s attempts to encourage exports to Cuba, farmers in the 
southeastern United States have benefited the most, through export of 
poultry, fish, rice, and corn, and their strategically proximate distance to
Cuban ports.33 The exports are permitted under a 2000 law that modified,
but did not repeal, the U.S. trade Embargo and subject to this law, Cuba 
is authorized to buy approved agricultural products, medicines, and medical
devices from the U.S. and is required to pay in cash.34 In 2015, the United
States has exported over $131 million of these trade goods to Cuba.35 
The central underlying tenets of the Helms-Burton Act include a pledge 
by the United States (1) to pursue a “mandatory international embargo” 
(see above) and (2) to “make preparations for a peaceful transition
government . . . [that] does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro.”36 
However, as noted herein, those central tenets have failed. If the Helms-
Burton Act succeeds, the Embargo will continue to isolate Cuba and
further worsen economic conditions in Cuba to the point that the Castro
regime is no longer sustainable, such that democratic reform would follow 
29. Jennifer M. Harris, The Winners of Cuba’s ‘New’ Economy, FORTUNE (Jan. 14,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/14/the-winners-of-cubas-new-economy/ [https://perma.cc/
4KG8-2B9D].
30. See Dominguez, supra note 26. 
31. Exports to Cuba by 5-digit End-Use Code, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.
census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/exports/c2390.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Z8UW-LCZR] (last visited Jan. 7, 2017). 
32. See Harris, supra note 29. 
33. Id. 
34. Drew Desilver, What We Know About Cuba’s Economy, PEW RES. CTR. (May
28, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/28/what-we-know-about-cubas­
economy/ [https://perma.cc/CG8A-VU6R]. 
35. U.S. Trade in Goods with Cuba, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2390.html [https://perma.cc/2G34-4RC3] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
36. See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 17; Eric Zolov, Let’s Revisit Helms-Burton, 
THE WORLD POST (Jan. 16, 2015) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-zolov/lets-revisit­
helmsburton_b_6488476.html [https://perma.cc/K52R-SV4N].
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to supplant the regime.37 The question is whether Cubans, who are desperate
for the necessities of modern life, from food and clothing, access to 
information and stability, to adequate transportation, and durable goods 
that are profoundly lacking in quality and quantity, are willing and able to
rise up against the regime. 
The decision to strengthen the Embargo has further isolated the Cuban 
people thus far, and left them without any option or recourse apart from 
complying with the demands of the dictator in power under the Castro
regime. In that way, the Helms-Burton Act further isolated Cuba and has
backfired as citizens have rallied behind the Castro regime that continues 
to vilify America.38 Since its inception, the Helms-Burton Act has unified
Cubans with the Castro regime, deepened the distrust of the United States
within Cuban society, and revitalized Castro’s failing oppressive regime.39 
Accordingly, the Helms-Burton Act has also increased the opposition of 
Castro and Cuban society towards U.S. backed reforms regarding human 
rights and democracy.40 Cubans otherwise opposed to Castro and his
policies have nevertheless remained unified with the Cuban government
against a common enemy, the United States, by virtue of having been
indoctrinated over decades with the proposition that the Embargo is the 
cause of all of the many problems that they face.41 
Moreover, the Helms-Burton Legislation attempts to exert democratic 
influence in a restrictive, but misleading way. The Act buttresses an antiquated 
Embargo and purports to enforce economic sanctions and coerce Cuba 
into establishing a democratic form of government. In developing countries, 
such as Cuba, where an autocratic regime depends on support from a few 
elite individuals and thus are not responsive to the overall population, the 
regime can employ extensive protectionism in which they control all of 
the methods and resources of production.42 In that way, the Embargo plays
to the strengths of the Castro regime and enables an economic system in
which the elite are justified in exerting power over an insulated market. 
Democratization, however, may break down the traditional structure supporting
protectionism, and could thus lead to change in the status quo.43 Yet, by 
37. See Dhooge, supra note 19, at 620. 
38. Stringent economic policies have provided a mechanism for the Castro regime
to rally nationalist support against, what is in their view, unduly oppressive economic sanctions 
imposed by the United States. See Zolov, supra note 36. 
39. See Ana Julia Jatar, Helms-Burton Backfire, WASH. POST, July 22, 1996, at 3. 
40. See Dhooge, supra note 19, at 624. 
41. Id.
 42. See Helen Milner, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy 
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way of completely isolating Cuba and discouraging other nations from 
engaging in any trade with the country, the Act restricts the flow of any 
relief, resources, or ideologies in a manner contrary to the characteristics
of the type of government it aims to establish.  The Helms-Burton Act continues
to strengthen the Castro regime by presenting it with expanded opportunities 
to appeal to Cuban nationalism through renewed attacks upon the U.S. for
being the cause of all problems facing Cuban society. The isolation of
Cuba has done more harm to the reputation and international perception 
of the U.S. because the Castro regime has used the threat posed by the
U.S. Government and the Embargo to justify the regulations and restraints 
imposed on the Cuban people.44 In essence, rather than forcing the Castro 
regime into submission, the Embargo is the very thing that has enabled 
the Castro regime to stay in power all these years.45 
III. A DANGEROUS STANDARD FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Helms-Burton Act also sets a dangerous precedent for international 
law and diminishes the effectiveness of American foreign policy. International
opposition to the Helms-Burton Act primarily stems from the perceived
far-reaching extraterritorial application of U.S. law that interferes with 
sovereign trade rights.46 As noted previously, the Congressional decision 
to codify and strengthen the Embargo was designed to pressure the Cuban
economy so that the Castro regime would no longer be viable.47  However, 
the Helms-Burton Act also had far-reaching implications for the trading 
allies of the United States by limiting their ability to engage in commerce 
44. A way to reverse this train of thought is to allow Cubans to prosper and open
trade to encourage an open privatized economy in which the government does not retain 
complete control. Instead of attempting to penalize the Castro regime and unite the Cuban 
people against their government, U.S. foreign policy ought to benefit the working class 
and make their lives easier through participation in the economy. See generally Lee H.
Hamilton, New Cuba Policy Will Bring the Benefits of Cooperation, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/new-cuba-policy­
will-brin_b_6526110.html?utm_hp_ref=90-miles [https://perma.cc/85R7-FEX4].
45. The author believes that Castro regime has survived in part by having used the 
Embargo to excuse shortcomings and deficiencies of their system. They have also soured 
the relationship between the two countries with their continuous anti-American propaganda. Id. 
46. See Dhooge, supra note 19, at 619. 
47. Helms-Burton Act: Resurrecting the Iron Curtain, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC
AFF. (June 10, 2011), http://www.coha.org/helms-burton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-curtain/
[https://perma.cc/E4LH-54KD]. 
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with Cuba, and unnecessarily restricting their autonomy in the process.48 
Foreign countries have steadily rejected the Helms-Burton Act and continue
to undermine its influence as an international sanction.49  Foreign countries’ 
retaliation against such an intrusive piece of international legislation is 
warranted, given that the Helms-Burton Act essentially attempts to restrict
their sovereignty and freedom to trade without limitation.50 
Accordingly, the Helms-Burton Act is seen as another instrument the
U.S. uses to meddle in foreign affairs and control all economic dealings 
involving American allies, while straining longstanding international
alliances and relationships by mandating who may trade with whom.51 The
United States’ authoritative stance in enacting legislation that attempts to
control resources and the flow of goods is strikingly similar to the domineering
control of the Castro regime that the Helms-Burton Act purports to eradicate
in the first place. Consequently, even steadfast allies of the United States 
view the Helms-Burton Act as unnecessarily, straining the country’s closest 
relationships and its reputation in the eyes of the international community 
at large.
Both Mexico and Canada have challenged the legality of Title IV of the 
Helms-Burton Act, claiming that it violates the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) because it restricts business persons from traveling
freely throughout the NAFTA countries.52 Both of America’s bordering
allies have called for meetings with NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission in 
48. For those reasons, the European Union condemned the Helms-Burton Act as an 
attempt by the United States to “unilaterally determine or restrict the European Union’s economic
and commercial relations with any other state . . . [in violation of] general principles of
international law and the sovereignty of independent states.” John M. Goshko, 3 Allies Join 
Call Against Cuba Embargo, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1996, at A19.
49. For example, “Canada has already passed legislation that would allow any person
subjected to damage awards in American courts to countersue in Canadian courts for 
amounts equal to those damage awards.” Dhooge, supra note 19, at 619. 
50. See Armando Chaguaceda, The Promise Besieged: Participation and Autonomy 
in Cuba, THE NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA (July/August 2011), 
https://nacla.org/article/promise-besieged-participation-and-autonomy-cuba [https://perma.cc/
J7HP-MUQ7].
51. Daniel Griswold, Dir., Cato Inst., Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo 
Against Cuba (Oct. 12, 2005). 
52. NAFTA Article 1105.1 provides that each NAFTA party “shall accord to
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Canadian officials 
contend that, “given the American prohibition on the investment of capital in Cuba as a 
result of the economic embargo, Title III amounts to de facto discrimination against
Canadian and Mexican investors engaged in activities that are legal in their home states.”
Christine L. Quickenden, Comment, Helms-Burton and Canadian-American Relations at 
the Crossroads: The Need for An Effective, Bilateral Cuban Policy, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 733, 758–59 (1997). 
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order to challenge the Helms-Burton Act as a NAFTA violation.53 In addition 
to the NAFTA challenge, the European Union has challenged the Helms-
Burton Act in the World Trade Organization.54 This stalemate and mounting
hostility between allies is an unwise foreign policy strategy that may divide
international allies based on a stubborn desire to keep the Embargo intact. 
Furthermore, only weeks after the bill was signed to law (as the Helms-
Burton Act), 34 of the 35 members of the Organization of American States
(OAS) passed a resolution declaring that the Helms-Burton Act did “not 
conform to international law.”55 Article 18 of the OAS Charter provides 
that “no state . . . has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”56 
The Embargo arguably violates this obligation as it functions to domineer 
other nations’ trade with Cuba.57 The internationalization of the Embargo 
creates resistance from many international organizations, but equally
significant, the legislation incites the Castro regime’s propaganda war
against American imperialism in Cuba as well as in the international
community.58 
In June 2009, at the OAS’s 39th General Assembly, a vote passed to lift 
Cuba’s suspension from the OAS that was in place since 1962.59 Article
 53. See Jeffrey Dunning, The Helms-Burton Act: A Step in the Wrong Direction for
United States Policy Towards Cuba, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 213, 229 (1998). 
54. The United States then informed the World Trade Organization that it will not
yield to any decision on the issue because it feels that the purpose of the World Trade 
Organization is not to review foreign policy or the national security interests of the United 
States. Id. at 230; Guy de Jonquieres & Lionel Barber, EU Puts US “Bully” in the WTO
Dock, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at 5a.
 55. See OAS Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to the
General Assembly 39, Aug. 29, 1996, http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/annual_reports.asp
[https://perma.cc/4NAM-4V5M]; see Free Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere, A.G.
Res. 1364 (XXVI-O/96) (June 4, 1996). 
56. Treaties and Agreements Organization of American States: Integrated Text of
the Charter As Amended by the Protocols of Buenos Aires and Cartagena De Indias; The 
Protocol of Amendment of Washington; and the Protocol of Amendment of Managua art 
18, Dec. 14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 981 (1994) [hereinafter OAS Charter].
57. See Dunning, supra note 53, at 231. 
58. See Rosell, supra note 17, at 239. The United Nations, Mexico, and Canada 
continue to encourage trade with Cuba, and Canada has alleged that the Helms-Burton Act 
violates international law and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Id.
59. Cuba was ousted from the OAS on January 21, 1962 by a vote of 14 to one 
(with Cuba as the only opposing nation), because Cuba did not abide by the Organization’s 
democratic principles stemming from the Cold War provisions. Nonetheless, Cuba was 
reinstated as a member to the OAS without any major political reform or meeting the conditions
that were necessary for reinstatement. See Ginger Thompson, Imposing Conditions, O.A.S.
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34 of the OAS Charter states, “Member States should refrain from practicing 
policies and adopting actions or measures that have serious adverse effects
on the development of other Member States.”60 The conclusion is that the
Helms-Burton Act violates also Article 19 of the OAS Charter because it
is a political measure enacted to coerce the sovereign will of another state 
(Cuba), and obtain advantages both economically and politically.61  Ultimately, 
the Helms-Burton Act functions to isolate Cuba and deter any trade involving 
Cuban goods or services. The purpose and intended consequences of the
Act directly conflict with this established provision of international law, 
yet the Embargo remains intact, and pressure from international authorities
has done little to change the status quo.
In 2013, the UN General Assembly, for the twenty-second year in a
row, condemned the U.S. Embargo through a resolution of 188 supporting 
member countries; all but two countries were opposed.62 Additionally, by 
a vote of 188 to 2, the Assembly approved a Cuban resolution condemning
the U.S. for causing over $1.126 trillion in damages as a result of over 50 
years of trade sanctions.63 The overwhelming international support of
these resolutions shows how international governing bodies view the 
underlying tenets of the Embargo with disdain. The international community
has not approved of the Embargo and its codification as the Helms-Burton 
Act since its establishment and there is no reason to believe that things 
will change unless the Act is comprehensively reformed. These antiquated
attempts to undermine the Cuban government have proven time and again
to be ineffective and reduce the credibility and reputation of the United
States as the progressive leader of the international community. 
Lifts Its Suspension of Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
06/04/world/americas/04cuba.html?_r=0&mtrref=undefined&gwh=8CDE08E85124A31
CD98CBA6014827727&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/7TN5-8EJW]. 
60. The Helms-Burton Act, by way of essentially destroying any possibility of
economic development of Cuba (Member State to the OAS), violates Article 34 of the 
OAS Charter and violates governing international law. OAS Charter, art. 34.
61. Article 38 of the OAS Charter indicates that, “Member States should work to 
improve international trade agreements and eliminate trade barriers and other impediments 
that disrupt trade between the States.”  OAS Charter, arts. 19, 38. 
62. The two opposing nations were the United States and Israel. Danielle Renwick,
U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.cfr.org/ 
cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 [https://perma.cc/TEK8-ZQUK].
63. Portia Siegelbaum, U.N. General Assembly votes against U.S. Cuba embargo 
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While the Helms-Burton Act vests the authority to terminate the Embargo 
with Congress, the Obama Administration, through Executive Action, has 
enacted several regulations aimed at normalizing American interaction with
Cuba.64 For example, changes under the Obama Administration have largely 
neutralized the tourism ban into an ineffective measure by allowing travelers
to self-report the purported legal reason for their travel to Cuba through 
their individual airline or travel agent and refrain from engaging in “tourism” 
on the island.65 Furthermore, while President Obama did not have the ability
to lift the Embargo completely, he was likely justified, within his executive
purview, to provide humanitarian aid that is aimed at improving healthcare, 
agriculture, and telecommunication.66 
A symbolic recent development taken towards rebuilding the U.S-Cuba
relationship occurred in August of 2015, when Secretary of State John Kerry 
traveled to Havana, and headed the official reopening of the U.S. Embassy
in Cuba, ushering in a new, more cordial era between the countries.67 This
visit marked the first time in over 70 years that such a high-ranking U.S. 
official visited Cuba.68 Among other issues addressed during the ceremony, 
Kerry focused on the need for political change in Cuba and warned that 
64. For instance, American can now use credit cards in Cuba and U.S. companies 
to export telephone, computer, and Internet technologies. General tourism is still
technically prohibited; however, Americans are allowed to visit Cuba for other related
reasons and can visit Cuba without obtaining special licenses. See Bradley Klapper and 
Michael Weissenstein, United States Loosens embargo against Cuba, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/united-states-loosens-embargo­
cuba/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ54-W7KC].
65. Michael Weissenstein, Obama Loosens Cuba Embargo, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 26,
2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-01-26/obama-administration-loosens­
cuba-embargo-with-new-measures [https://perma.cc/QPG4-XDTU]. 
66. Elise Labott, John Kerry reopens embassy in Cuba, but tensions remain, CNN 
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/14/politics/cuba-embassy-opening-john­
kerry-visit/ [https://perma.cc/Q5BK-6NGE].
67. Karen DeYoung, In historic Cuba visit, Kerry presides over raising of U.S. flag 




68. Paul Richter, John Kerry makes a historic visit to Cuba that will be more symbolism 
than substance, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico­
americas/la-fg-kerry-cuba-20150812-story.html [https://perma.cc/VHD8-FZJW]. 
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Congress would not lift the economic Embargo unless the Cuban government
made sufficient progress regarding Cuban human rights and worked towards 
a democratic political structure.69 This step toward the restoration of 
diplomatic relations will not in any way end the Helms-Burton Act, which 
will likely stay in effect as long as Cuba remains unable to choose their 
leaders as a genuine democracy.70 At the same time, the Embargo may very
well remain ineffective as the same trade between the countries continues and
the dictatorship balks at the idea of relinquishing power. 
Furthermore, during the last part of his presidency, President Obama 
announced his intention to close the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, claiming that, “It is viewed as a stain on our broader record of 
upholding the highest standards of rule of law, and that the facility 
undermines, rather than advances our national security.”71 However, such 
an ambitious plan to terminate the Guantanamo Bay facility once and for
all was met with harsh opposition from Congress and local legislatures.72 
The stalemate perpetuated by the Embargo is only harming the citizens it 
was designed to benefit.
V. POLITICAL GRIDLOCK ENCUMBERS CHANGE
When President Kennedy proclaimed a total embargo against Cuba in
1962, the vehicle he used was the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 
69. Sec. of State Kerry described the hoisting of the flag as a “historic moment” 
between the U.S. and Cuba, but the gesture is more symbolic in nature than anything
because he reiterated that the U.S. would not relent in moving for political change in Cuba.
Id.; John Sopel, US flag raised over reopened Cuba embassy in Havana, BRITISH
BROADCAST CORPORATION (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america- 
33919484 [https://perma.cc/D4RG-VZB4].
70. See Sopel, supra note 69. 
71. President Obama believes that, “Guantanamo Bay Prison reflects poor legal and
detainment practices while symbolizing crude antiterrorism tactics. Part of the strategy
involves creating a prison for terrorist detainees on American soil that would house 30 to 
60 detainees that are considered too dangerous to release. The remaining detainees would 
be transported to prisons in other countries.” Charlie Savage and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, 
Obama Sends Plan to Close Guantanamo to Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/us/politics/obama-guantanamo-bay.html [https:// 
perma.cc/J2CU-MGER].
72. Congress has already enacted a law banning the military from transferring
detainees from Guantanamo onto domestic soil, and lawmakers have shown little interest 
in lifting that restriction. The vote in the Senate was 91-3 in favor and this overwhelming
majority has enough supporters to override a Presidential Veto. Id.; see also Ted Barrett, 
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(TWEA).73 Pursuant to the TWEA, the U.S. government issued the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations on July 8, 1963.74 Since Kennedy first implemented
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, each subsequent President has
deliberately chosen to keep them intact.75 
The Helms-Burton Act vested the power to enforce the Embargo with 
Congress itself. The Act states that, “[t]he President shall instruct the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to enforce fully the
Cuban Assets Regulations set forth in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations.”76 It follows that, in order to dissolve the Embargo, Congress 
alone would have to repeal the Helms-Burton Act.77 Since the Helms-
Burton Act was passed, the Executive Branch no longer has the unilateral 
authority to end the Embargo, and that aspect may violate the Separation
of Powers doctrine. The Embargo was enacted by a unilateral executive
action; therefore, its dissolution, if and when that should occur, must be
subject to the same discretion of the Executive Branch. The Helms-Burton 
Act takes this power to regulate and conduct international affairs away
from the President and mandates that a two-thirds senate majority terminate
the Embargo. The resulting issue is whether the shift of responsibility for 
the Embargo usurps an important Presidential Power under the Constitution 
vis-à-vis the Separation of Powers law upheld by the Supreme Court.78 
73. The Trading With the Enemy Act [hereinafter TWEA] prohibits trade or attempt to
trade, directly or indirectly, with a nation that is considered an enemy. Trading with the Enemy 
Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917). 
74. These regulations apply to all individuals and entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction, 
whether they are in the United States or abroad prohibiting “all dealings in, including, 
without limitation, transfers, withdrawals, or exportations of, any property or evidences of 
indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property by any person.” 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (1996).
75. Matt Peppe, Repealing the US Embargo on Cuba: The Legislative Process in
the US Congress, http://www.globalresearch.ca/repealing-the-us-embargo-on-cuba-the­
legislative-process-in-the-us-congress/5424312 [https://perma.cc/59CH-CLW8] (last visited
Feb. 10, 2017). 
76.  22 U.S.C. § 6032 (1996).
77. See Peppe, supra note 75. 
78. The Court held that Congress may not promulgate a statute granting to itself a 
legislative veto over actions of the Executive Branch which is inconsistent with the
bicameralism principle and Presentment Clause of the United States Constitution. The 
Helms-Burton Act effectively is a statutory basis for Congress to veto and completely
determine actions of the Executive Branch. Embargos are matters of international affairs 
that the Executive Branch predominately enters with wide discretion. The President’s
power to conduct foreign affairs regarding the Cuban Embargo is virtually nullified by the 
Helms-Burton Act and this unjust usurping of authority violates Constitutional Law. See
INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983). 
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Under this analysis, the Helms-Burton Act is an unsupported creation of 
international law that usurps the authority of the Executive Branch and 
violates Supreme Court rulings.
The President should not be bound by such legislation in the first place 
because there is no legal justification for the regulations against Cuba,
which were created under the Cold War assumption that Cuba was our 
enemy, which is no longer the case.79 Congress has never declared war on 
Cuba; therefore, there is no legal justification for categorizing Cuba as an 
enemy of the U.S. under TWEA. Furthermore, the entire set of Cuban Asset 
Control Regulations in the Treasury Code is illegitimate because if Cuba 
is not an enemy, regulations that only apply to enemy nations cannot be 
used as the basis for promulgating the Embargo via authority from TWEA.80 
What is the scope of Presidential authority, then? Is the authority part 
and parcel of the autonomy traditionally afforded a President insofar as 
international affairs are concerned (where the President must wait for 
Congress to lift the Embargo), or can the President enact agreements by
way of unilateral action that brings change?81 Congress should enact 
comprehensive legislation that would fundamentally alter relations with
Cuba. However unlikely, unless true democratic progress is made in Cuba 
on par with Congressional satisfaction, the Legislative Branch should step 
in and adjudicate the separation of powers question and determine that the 
Executive Branch has the authority to settle this international disagreement
that it had previously created. Then progress can be truly made, as the
President would be able to repeal the Embargo in its entirety.
If this happens, business in the U.S. would have permission and an
interest in entering the Cuban market and in competing with other foreign 
companies that continue to do business with the country despite the 
Helms-Burton provisions.82 Cuba’s standard of living and entirely outdated
infrastructure would benefit immensely from the influence of American
79. Cuba does not meet the definition of an enemy. According to the TWEA, an 
“enemy” is defined as “any individual” or “the government of any nation with which the 
United States is at war.” The Act specifies that the “beginning of the war” is “midnight
ending the day on which Congress has declared or shall declare war or the existence of
a state of war.” See Peppe, supra note 75; TWEA, 50 U.S.C. § 4032 (2015). 
80. The President is justified in using executive power to repeal provisions that have 
no legal force behind them. Therefore, the President is likely justified in terminating the
Embargo that hinges on TWEA until Congress decides to amend the TWEA to modify the 
definition of an enemy, or pass a separate provision granting President power to enforce 
an embargo against a country when the United States is not at war with that country. The 
situation as it currently stands is not founded in valid law. See Peppe, supra note 75. 
81. Id. 
82. See Dunning, supra note 53, at 235–36. 
340
    
  





   
   
  
 








    
 
 




   
 
   
 




EISELMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/2017 10:38 AM 
[VOL. 18:  325, 2017] Cuba Libre
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
investment.83 As United States’ trade and tourist dollars flood Cuba, Castro’s
power and influence in Cuba will shrink and the Cuban people will have 
leverage to bring about noticeable social and political reforms.84 Consequently,
the United States would finally possess the requisite support and influence 
to implement change in Cuba successfully and oust the Castro regime
once and for all. 
VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO
The lack of economic freedom (in Cuba) has been as devastating to
prosperity as the lack of political freedom to human dignity.85 During the
1940s, the Cuban economy thrived as the nation had implemented a
constitution that was highly progressive and democratic for that part of
Latin America.86 The economy boomed, especially for the wealthy and
for foreigners, and Cuban health care was relatively advanced for a Latin 
American country, with infant mortality rates comparative to those of the 
United States and Canada.87 It was the promise of Castro’s Revolution 
that these aspects of life in Cuba would not be only for the wealthy and
foreigners; rather, that all Cubans would have access to health care and
education. Once the Castro regime took power, however, the dream of the 
society envisioned by Castro was dashed as the Cuban people had their
political autonomy, independent economic activity, and media outlets
suppressed as the Castro regime formed a military and economic alliance 
with the Soviet Union.88 
As Castro developed and alliance with the Soviet Union, the United 
States saw Cuba as an even greater threat to democracy in the Americas,
and ramped up economic sanctions on Cuba.89 Yet as the threat of
83. Due to the weak Cuban economy resulting from the Embargo, the Cuban economic 
climate is ripe for innovation and investments that would be mutually beneficial to both 
countries over time. See id.
 84. Id. 
85. The Dream Deferred: Fear and Freedom in Fidel’s Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
10 (Dec. 2003), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/27198.htm [https://perma.cc/WF7T­
VMA8].
86. Democratic voting for Presidential elections that was free and free of corruption 
occurred in 1940, 1944, and 1948. See id. at 1. 
87. Id. 
88. Cuba relied, and eventually became dependent upon the Soviet Union economically, 
militarily, and emulated their communist political structure. Id. at 2. 
89. Khrushchev and Eisenhower Trade Threats Over Cuba (2009), http://www. 
history.com/this-day-in-history/khrushchev-and-eisenhower-trade-threats-over-cuba.
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Communism in Cuba and Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the 
Soviet Union itself collapsed, the economic Embargo is still enforced and
continues to restrict the Cuban people from realizing their economic and
personal potential.90 Presently, Cuba is among the poorest countries in the
western hemisphere91 and will continue to be as economic sanctions constrain 
any possibility of progression. The Embargo has stymied Cuban economic
growth and when analyzed by practically any measure of economic
performance, Cuba was progressing at faster level in 1958 than it is in the 
present day.92 Agricultural resources were plentiful in Cuba before the 
Castro Regime seized power and during the period of the Soviet influence 
in Cuba, Cuba’s resources were subsidized and were also abundant; however, 
during the 1990s when Soviet subsidies dissipated and the Helms-Burton
Act was circulating, Cuba’s food consumption declined strikingly.93 Furthermore,
the amount of automobiles per capita in Cuba has surprisingly declined since 
the 1950s, making it the only country in the western hemisphere for which
there has not been an increase.94 
The antiquated Embargo has also contributed to deficiencies in Cuban 
technology leading to the nation’s outdated communication infrastructure.95 
Communication improvements are arguably the most powerful economic 
stimulus for long-term sustainability for investment in Cuba.96 In lifting 
restrictions, the United States will be able to facilitate and integrate more 
contact and communication among all individuals and businesses through 
90. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Zenith And Eclipse: A Comparative Look at Socio-
Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro and Present Day Cuba (2002), https://2009-2017. 
state.gov/p/wha/ci/cu/14776.htm [https://perma.cc/MC7P-GEMF] [hereinafter Zenith and
Eclipse].
91.  Per capita consumption of cereals, tubers, and meat are today all below 1950’s 
levels. Meat supplies have fallen from 33 kg per year to 23 kg per year on average.  See id. 
92. See id.
93. Cuba ranks last in per capita daily caloric consumption compared to other Latin
American countries. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. For a point of reference, the amount of telephone lines in present day Cuba is 
roughly the same as there were in the 1950’s. The Embargo has hindered communication 
advancement and stalled any new developments. Id. 
96. Jack Leslie, How U.S. Brands Can Engage The New Cuba, THE WORLD POST
(July 20, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jack-leslie/how-us-brands-can-engage­
the-new-cuba_b_7833140.html?utm_hp_ref=90-miles [https://perma.cc/Q9T3-QKNW];
United Parcel Service (UPS) has indicated that it is willing to provide logistics services in
connection with Cuban businesses and Verizon and Sprint aim to offer cell phone roaming 
on the island. Carnival Cruise Line, which already operates vacation cruises in much of 
the Caribbean plans to open up access to Cuba and has obtained approval from the U.S. 
and Cuba governments to sail to Cuba. Mark J. Miller, Door Opens Slightly for US Brands 
in Cuba, But Plenty of Barriers Still Remain, BRAND CHANNEL (Sept. 21, 2015), http:// 
brandchannel.com/2015/09/21/cuba-brands-092115/ [https://perma.cc/MM6H-2P97]. 
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communications technology.97  In Cuba, there are seven computers per 100 
people and Internet access is expensive.98 Approximately five percent of
Cubans have consistent access to the Internet and broadband access is
more expensive than in the United States.99 These unique challenges present 
opportunities to connect an entire country that is largely offline and
disconnected with the outside word. However, American companies eager
to capitalize on the communications market must realize that, to succeed
in Cuba, it will be imperative to earn the trust and respect of all members 
of the partnership as well as the Cuban government.100 
In a best-case scenario, new mediums of communication, including 
broadcasting, television programs, and Internet access, will encourage the 
flow of information and economic activity while promoting free speech.101 
These democratic values will permeate Cuban culture over time and allow 
a natural, grass-roots transition to a free Cuba that has not been possible
under the current regime. This reform will certainly not happen quickly,
but it is anticipated that continued engagement will gradually produce 
positive change.102 
Another contention between the two countries is the U.S. State Department’s
designation of Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” a status labeled in 
the early 1980’s in light of the Castro regime supporting and training rebels
in Central America.103  Castro announced in 1992 that Cuba would support
neither insurgents abroad nor within the Soviet Union, and the State
Department’s annual reports since 2013 have stated there has been no 
evidence that Cuba provided training, weaponries, or other aid terrorist 
groups.104  However, Cuba’s uninterrupted placement on the list has been
a major obstacle to talks about restoring diplomatic relations. Cuban officials 
97.  Marketing communications pertaining to products and services may end up
doing more to determine the shape of U.S.–Cuban relations in the decades to come than 
diplomatic dispatches pertaining to politics. See Hamilton, supra note 44. 
98. See Dominguez, supra note 26. 
99. Leslie, supra note 96.
 100. See id.
 101. See Hamilton, supra note 44.
102. This is in part due to Cuba’s slow rate of electrical power development. Cuba 
ranks next to last in electrical power development among Latin American countries. Id.;
Zenith and Eclipse, supra note 89. 
103. See Renwick, supra note 62. 
104. See id.
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have previously taken the position that they would cease all discussions
concerning diplomatic relations while Cuba remained on the list.105 
On April 14, 2015, President Obama announced his intention to remove
Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.106 Such a step to remove
Cuba from the list is a positive one taken with good will to put the Cold 
War-era hostility in the past and restructure the relationship between the 
United States and Cuba.107  It is worth pointing out that once Cuba is removed
from the list, the case for classifying the nation as an “enemy” under 
TWEA is less tenable, as they will not be seen as any tangible threat in
that regard. Cuba’s removal from the list is far overdue and an updated
list without Cuba reinforces the notion that change can be made with a 
nation that is not seen as an enemy. A determination by the State Department
that Cuba had not engaged in terrorist activity in the past six months (a 
prerequisite for designating a country a state sponsor of terrorism), would
be a key factor for the removal of Cuba from the list.108 The Communist
undertones and threats of terrorism in Cuba have all but evaporated, which 
is of great importance when considering the reasonableness of the Helms-
Burton restrictions moving forward. 
105. This designation is wholly unsupported in modern day and is a constant a
blemish to their nation’s image that has prevented Cuba from conducting business and led
some members of the international community to shy away from communication and 
relationships with Cuba. Randal C. Archibold & Julie H. Davis, Cuba to Be Removed From




106. The Obama administration justified this action via a State Department statement 
in May 2015: “The rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism reflects
our assessment that Cuba meets the statutory criteria for rescission. While the United States has
significant concerns and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, 
these fall outside the criteria relevant to the rescission of a state sponsor of terrorism 
designation.” While the Obama administration and lawmakers are still against many
Cuban policies, they felt these political differences were insufficient to justify continued 
inclusion on the list. See Nahal Toosi, Cuba removed from U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism, POLITICO (May 29, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/us-removes­
cuba-state-sponsor-terrorism-118411 [https://perma.cc/C9JL-X6SL]; see also Julie H. Davis,
U.S. Removes Cuba From State-Sponsored Terrorism List, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/us/us-removes-cuba-from-state-terrorism-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/JQA6-7L5Y]. 
107. The list of state sponsors of terrorism now only includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. 
While this gesture does not terminate the conditions of the Embargo, it certainly redefines
the relationship between the two nations. See Archibold & Davis, supra note 105. 
108. The removal of Cuba from this list of nations that the United States openly
recognizes as sponsoring terrorism signals change and eliminates another impediment to
restoring diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. See Archibold & Davis, supra
note 105. 
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A. Phone Service, Communication, and Infrastructure 
In 1994, the United States and Cuba agreed to restore direct phone links 
between their countries, which had been disconnected because of the Cold
War conflict.109 This undertaking renewed ties between thousands of
families and friends divided by political disagreement.110 However, in the
middle of December 2000, Castro tried to impose a 10 percent tax on
phone calls between Cuba and the United States.111 Originally, the Clinton 
Administration prohibited the U.S. phone companies from complying with 
Castro and paying the tax because it was not part of the joint agreement 
between the countries and as such, the surcharge was unwarranted.112 The
tax was implemented after the U.S. Congress froze over $120 million of
Cuban assets that were generated by calls between the United States and 
Cuba.113 The funds were used to pay compensation to the families of the
three Cuban exile pilots, all U.S. citizens, who were killed in the Brothers 
to the Rescue incident.114 
Shortly after the Obama Administration announced the opening of
telecommunications with Cuba, New Jersey based company, IDT Corporation,
became the first company to complete a deal with Cuba, and is currently 




111. Christopher Marquis, Cuba Threatens to Cut Off Phone Service to the States,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/09/us/cuba-threatens-to-cut-off­
phone-service-to-the-states.html [https://perma.cc/WCF5-6XA7]; See Patrick Oppmann,
Cuba cuts 10% tax on $3-a-minute phone calls between island, U.S., CNN (Nov. 30 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/30/world/americas/cuba-phone-call-tax-cut/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9G9K-B2NH].
112. See Rosell, supra note 17, at 246. 
113. See id. Subject to this provision, calls originating in Cuba to U.S. phone 
numbers had to pass through a third country, making them much more expensive. Payton
Guion, Cuba and the US to establish direct phone links for the first time in 15 years, 
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/cuba­
and-the-us-to-establish-direct-phone-links-for-the-first-time-in-15-years-10103895.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3AY-2EF3]; see also New Cuba US direct phone link established, 
BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world­
latin-america-31844847 [https://perma.cc/YNY7-75RX].
114.  The Cuban government argued that the tax was the only way for the country to
raise the $58 million to be paid to the families of the victims of the Brothers to the Rescue 
plane accident and only rescinded the tax after the full reparation amount was recovered. 
See Oppmann, supra note 111; see Rosell, supra note 17, at 246.
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facilitating direct calls to and from Cuba.115 The Federal Communications
Commission authorized IDT to provide international long-distance support
for telephone calls between the U.S. and Cuba, which is a huge step for 
connecting separated families as well as laying the foundation for investment 
opportunities for U.S. companies.116 The opening of telecommunications
has already created opportunities for companies like Netflix, which has started
providing streaming services to Cuban citizens. In addition, the cooperation 
between Cuba and IDT Corporation is leading to normalized communications 
and Internet access between the U.S. and Cuba despite the restrictions of the
Embargo.117 
The possibility of building a digital business or any business relying on 
online sales is unlikely, because of the lack of internet availability in Cuba. 
According to an industry survey, Cuba’s dial-up internet access is heavily 
censored and is the world’s second slowest.118 The National Registry of
Serial Publications must first approve all material intended for publication 
on the internet, and individuals must request access to service providers
from the Cuban government.119 At present, about 5 percent of Cubans are 
able to get online, and can do so only through purchasing an access card sold 
by the state phone company, ETECSA, which costs about $2 for an hour
of internet use.120 Cuban authorities point to the Embargo as the reason
115. The restoration of a telecom agreement, announced in December 2014 as part
of the Obama administration’s framework for repairing diplomatic relations with Cuba has
allowed U.S. companies to sell individual communications equipment in Cuba, and take
on projects to improve Cuba’s outdated Internet and telecom infrastructure. See Mimi
Whitefield, First U.S. telecom company connects directly with Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 6,
2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article12816176.html 
[https://perma.cc/4NV2-EYUJ].
116. IDT Chief Executive Officer, Bill Pereira said, “This is an important first step 
in the liberalization of telecommunications between the U.S. and Cuba, ultimately, the
agreement will make it easier and more affordable for our customers to call friends and 
family in Cuba.” As of March 2015, IDT charges 76.8 cents per minute of call to a Cuban 
cell phone and 83.3 cents per minute for calls to a landline. Id. 
117. In February 2015, Netflix announced that Cubans with access to Internet would
be able to subscribe to the service and watch popular movies and TV shows for fees 
starting at $7.99 per month via international payment methods; however, few Cubans have 
been able to afford this luxury, and many do not even have internet access regularly. So 
far, the Netflix venture has been only symbolic of free enterprise, as nearly all Internet 
service in Cuba is dial-up and too slow to support Netflix streaming. See id.
 118. Wired, at Last, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
18285798 [https://perma.cc/644Y-J5PJ].
119. José Azel, Cuba’s Internet repression equals groupthink, CUBA DEMOCRACIA 
Y VIDA (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.cubademocraciayvida.org/web/article.asp?artID= 
13302 [https://perma.cc/8PQF-L9GE]. 
120. The average monthly income of Cubans (about 20 USD per month) makes Cuba 
an unattractive and unprofitable market for major U.S. companies. The purchasing power
of the average Cuban household would not be able to afford residential Internet connection.
The slow connections and outdated technology in Cuba makes it impossible for citizens to 
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internet access is so poor, citing the Bush Administration’s decision to 
exclude Cuba from using readily available communication cables.121 The
censorship and control exerted by the Cuban government and the low earnings 
of Cuban citizens present serious challenges to establishing secure and
obtainable internet access.
B. Travel Restrictions and Tourism 
American citizens enjoy the right to travel to all countries including
those with radically different political systems such as China, Vietnam,
and North Korea, but are precluded from a convenient venture to Cuba 
merely 90 miles off the coast of Florida.122  Until very recently, Cuba was 
the only country in the world off-limits to U.S. tourists.123 It has recently 
become easier for Americans to legally visit Cuba for reasons other than
tourism. Under Helms-Burton, U.S. citizens are authorized to travel to Cuba 
for specific non-tourism purposes, including business trips, family visits,
or “people-to-people exchanges.”124 
load many websites. Rather than having complex filtering systems, the government relies 
on the high cost of getting online and the telecommunications infrastructure that is slow 
to restrict Internet access. See Carrie Kahn, Internet Access Expands in Cuba – For Those
Who Can Afford It, NPR (Oct. 16, 2015, 4:48 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/ 
2015/10/06/445998527/internet-access-expands-in-cuba-for-those-who-can-afford-it [https://
perma.cc/ZYW3-287K].
121.  Although a fiber-optic cable, capable of carrying heavy data traffic, runs along 
the island’s northern coast, George W. Bush’s administration blocked a proposal by AT&T 
to grant Cubans access to the cable. Wired, at last, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2011), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/18285798 [https://perma.cc/T2TA-QSBM].
122. One possibility to achieve reform in this area and mitigate the effects of the 
Helms-Burton Act would be to encourage recreational tourism to Cuba instead of criminalizing 
it. The travel businesses, airline companies, and constituents themselves would put pressure on
their representatives in Congress, whose political careers depend on the private funding 
they receive from companies and individuals. See Salim Lamrani, How Barack Obama
Can End the Economic Sanctions Against Cuba, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2015, 
12:49 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/salim-lamrani/how-barack-obama-can­
end-_b_6476458.html?utm_hp_ref=90-miles [https://perma.cc/TS4J-6YJ2]. 
123. Patrick Oppmann, 7 things Americans should know about travel to Cuba, CNN 
(Sept. 22, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/17/travel/cuba-travel-feat/index.
html [https://perma.cc/KQF4-4WDH].
124. Previously, these purposes required applying for a specific license and finessing
through a myriad of governmental agencies. Now, many U.S. citizens can essentially “self 
license” if their justification for travel to Cuba meets the new, more relaxed legal travel
standards. See Oppman, supra note 123. 
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Only Congress can lift the U.S. travel ban imposed against Cuba as part
of the provisions of the Embargo.125 Nevertheless, in 2015, the Obama
Administration further diminished the effects of the Helms-Burton restrictions 
by using Executive authority to grant exceptions to the travel ban.126 For
instance, in January 2015, President Obama authorized U.S. citizens to 
legally travel to Cuba if they are engaging in one of 12 separate categories
of activities including “professional research, journalistic activity, participating 
in an athletic event, religious activities, working on a humanitarian project 
or taking part in educational activities.”127 Previously, these activities
required specific licenses that were difficult to obtain and subject to broad
governmental discretion; however, American citizens can today obtain 
licenses easily if they meet relaxed legal requirements that are much more
straightforward.128 
In March 2015, U.S. officials met with Cuban diplomats in Washington, 
D.C., where they agreed that their countries’ 1953 “air transport agreement”
was outdated, according to the State and Transportation Department
officials.129 Currently, American and Cuban travelers must fly on charter 
flights that are complicated to schedule and often force travelers to undergo
a cumbersome process of emailing documents and payment information
back and forth with an agent.130 The U.S. officials proposed basic parameters
for a new arrangement, including that any U.S. airline could serve Cuba 
125. Lamrani, supra note 122.
126. Until the Obama Administration’s recent modifications to the travel restrictions 
of the Helms-Burton Act, U.S. citizens with valid authority and even visiting Cuba illegally had
first travel to another country and fly into Cuba via a third country. Accordingly, many
individuals were subject to unsafe flight conditions and erratic scheduling of Cubana Airlines,
the poorly funded state airliner. See Oppman, supra note 123. 
127. Journalists, both full time and freelance, are allowed to engage in travel and 
travel-related transactions as well as their support and broadcast assistants. However, the 
journalist’s schedule of activities “must not include free time or recreation in excess
of that consistent with a full-time schedule.” Frequently Asked Questions Related to Cuba,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2–3 (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.treasury.gov/resource­
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LWW-338D]
[hereinafter U.S Treasury FAQ]; see also 31 CFR § 515.563 (2012).
128. Restrictions on bank accounts and currency flow have been loosened considerably.
Currently, “[p]ersons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are traveling to Cuba pursuant to
one of the 12 authorized categories of travel may open and maintain bank accounts in order 
to access funds while located in Cuba for authorized transactions, and are authorized to
close such accounts.” See U.S. Treasury FAQ, supra note 127, at 13. 
129. Felicia Schwartz, Jack Nicas & Carol E. Lee, Obama Administration Pushes 
for Deal to Start Flights to Cuba by Year’s End, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2015, 9:13 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administration-pushes-for-deal-to-start-flights-to­
cuba-by-years-end-1439860422 [https://perma.cc/M85A-PEQQ]. 
130. Bradley Klapper, US Cuba to Resume Mail Service this Year; Other Steps Near, 
ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 17, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://m.uticaod.com/article/ZZ/20150917/NEWS/ 
309179926/16910/NEWS/?Start=2 [https://perma.cc/U2KF-ST4P].
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without any limitations.131 American Airlines said it expects to operate
1,200 charter flights to Cuba this year, a 9% increase from 2014.132 
Since Secretary Kerry attended the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in 
Cuba in August 2015, travel from the U.S. to Cuba has increased by 35% 
as of September 2015.133 This is the sort of progress that is needed in order 
to ignite the Cuban economy and generate beneficial results for the U.S. 
and Cuba. An injection of American culture, ideas, and investment will
help speed the process and transition to a democratic government in Cuba. 
President Obama has one form of recourse that would dampen the effects
of the economic sanctions that affect all classes and sectors of Cuban 
society, and which remains the principal obstacle to development in Cuba.134 
While an influx of tourists would clearly benefit the Cuban economy, whose 
resources are largely dependent on this sector,135 it would also benefit the
U.S. economy.136 
Beginning with transportation and tourism reform, the Executive Branch
has sufficient flexibility to cause the U.S. Congress to end the economic
sanctions that continue to isolate Cuba despite the stated purpose of the
Helms-Burton Act. Cubans and Americans alike would be the major
beneficiaries of a reestablishing normal economic, commercial, and
financial relations between the two nations. 
131. According to the official, the United States and Cuba are beginning to form a 
stronger commercial partnership by way of with direct postal service and an agreement on 
regularly scheduled commercial flights between the two countries. See id. 
132. See Schwartz, Nicas & Lee, supra note 129. 
133. Id.
134. A huge market would open up for American airlines, the transportation industry, and
travel agencies, not to mention other mass tourism-related sectors. To date, only 90,000 US
citizens (other than Cuban-Americans), visit Cuba every year for business, academic,
cultural, humanitarian or sporting reasons, under licenses granted by the State Department. 
See Lamrani, supra note 122; Matt Beardmore, How Travel to Cuba May Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/travel/how-travel-to-cuba­
may-change.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S8PX-6XJY]. 
135. See TRAVEL & TOURISM, ECONOMIC IMPACT 2014, CUBA, WORLD TRAVEL &
TOURISM COUNCIL (2014) https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact­
research/country-reports-2014/cuba2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ7L-LH3L]. 
136. Cuba imports most of its food commodities, and U.S. agricultural producers would
benefit greatly from the demand that more American tourists would create. Furthermore,
President Obama could give directions to the Treasury Department not to prosecute US 
citizens who travel to Cuba outside of the administratively defined framework. This would
allow more flexible tourist travel to Cuba and restore fundamental rights afforded to all 
citizens of the United States of America under the Constitution, which protects the right
of its citizens to travel freely. See Lamrani, supra note 122. 
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C. Human Rights and Public Health in Cuba
One facet of the Helms-Burton legislation is that it was designed to bring 
about change by encouraging as many countries as possible to reduce their 
contact with Cuba and erode Cuba’s government and society.137 The expanded
territorial reach of the Helms-Burton Act, which reaches far beyond trade 
between Cuba and the U.S., forbids not only all American investment, travel, 
and human contact with Cuba, but also isolated Cuba from any prospective
international investors who were allied with the United States.138 Such 
comprehensive sanctions deprive Cuba of access to basic provisions for 
everyday life.139 The Helms-Burton Act codified the policy of preserving 
costly licensing requirements for trading health-related products with Cuba, 
which hikes up the prices for these essential goods and in turn harms the 
health of Cuban citizens.140 Cubans’ human rights are suffering because of 
the very Embargo that was intended to defend and improve those same human
rights under the autocratic Castro regime.141 




Cuban authorities have approved private enterprise in 181 designated 
activities (later expanded to 201 designated activities), and for tax purposes, 
have categorized these activities into seven groups aimed at creating a more 
137.  Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The 
Case of the Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 199, 235 (2007). 
138. Aside from economic impact, this chilling effect has had drastic ramifications 
for human rights in Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act has achieved its goal in exacerbating the 
central tenets of the Embargo and increased the widespread and indiscriminate effects on
the economic and social conditions, as well as the overall wellbeing of the Cuban people. 
Id.
139. Restrictions of the Embargo make it difficult for Cubans to obtain access to 
important medicines, scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment, 
and electricity. U.S. companies produce about half of all newly patented drugs in the world
and the Cuban cost of obtaining licenses in order to purchase such drugs amounted to over
$75.7 million in 2005 alone. Licensing procedures mandate that healthcare drugs are 
exclusively available to Cubans through intermediaries at prices that much higher than
they would be in the American market. See id. at 238, 241–42. 
140. Id. at 236–37, 243; Gary Hart, Fiction in Foreign Policy, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 7, 2011, 12:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/fiction-in-foreign­
policy_b_832321.html?view=print [https://perma.cc/3TG9-N4TW]. 
141. The Embargo increases the cost of educational goods by requiring them to be 
purchased at additional cost from non-U.S. sources, while constraining the ability of private 
U.S. organizations and charity foundations to provide assistance to Cuban schools. Id. at
238, 245. 
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streamlined tax regime.142 Cuban government authorities grant or deny
these licenses and, in most cases, they are approved within one week from 
the date that the application is received.143 Authorities have an interest in
approving licenses as quickly as possible because they are a source of fiscal 
revenue and create community employment opportunities.144  Private economic
activity within Cuba is severely diminished compared to the State enterprise 
of the country as well as when compared with most other countries in the 
world (including countries in flux and those recovering from the loss of 
similar Communist regime subsidies).145 In order to improve the GDP and
overall economic conditions in Cuba, the private sector must be bolstered
and stabilized. An economic change providing an influx to the private 
sector would be the catalyst needed to realize Cuban potential and bring 
about a political shift that favors capitalism and private sector competition,
rather than total governmental domination.
It is in the best interest of large middle classes who perceive their
opportunities to be hindered by dictatorial structures to advocate for 
democracy;146 however, this has not yet occurred in Cuba. While the
142. Group 1: The production and sale of food and beverages; Group 2: The production
and sale of artisan and industrial products, for example artisan crafts, pottery, religious 
articles including animals for religious purposes; Group 3: Personal and technical services, 
for example repair of electrical and mechanical equipment, beauty salons, animal grooming,
clothing rentals, event planners, photography; Group 4: Room rentals, for example bed
and breakfasts; Group 5: Construction and remodeling, for example bricklayers, carpenters,
electricians, plumbers; Group 6: Transportation of persons and materials,  including trucks, boats 
and animal transport; Group 7: Other activities, for example music and other arts teachers,
sports instructors, computer programming, flower sales, clowns and magicians; “Simple
Activities”; A category that benefits from a simplified tax regime. Richard E. Feinberg,
Soft Landing in Cuba? Emerging Entrepreneurs and Middle Classes, LATIN AMERICA 
INITIATIVE 12 (Nov. 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/11/
cuba-emerging-entrepreneurs-middle-classes-feinberg/cuba-entrepreneurs-middle-classes­
feinberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ74-TT9B].
143. The most popular licensing choices for entrepreneurs are restaurants and the 
food industry, followed by bed and breakfasts, transportation (taxis), construction, street 
vendors of agricultural products, music sales (CDs), recycling, and repair of household
appliances (this has become increasingly popular for Cuban entrepreneurs because it is 
taxed more lightly as opposed to other groups). Id. at 13. 
144. Id.
 145. Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, The Institutional Structure of Production in the Cuban
Economy 227 (Jan. 2014), http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/v24­
hernandezcata.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB7F-QPLH].
146. “Middle classes in Latin America and globally are considered to have strong
pro-democracy preferences. While there is no guarantee that an emerging middle class will 
result in pressure for greater democracy in Cuba, there is evidence that the trend could 
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Cuban middle class has been built by socialist structures, and many individuals 
continue to believe in ideology that provides universal access to social
services and benefits, there is a paradigm shift in which these individuals 
aspire to be just that, individual. The Cuban government and foreign investors 
must anticipate their need for realistic economic opportunity, individual
autonomy, and material prosperity. While it is too soon to suggest that 
the Cuban middle class will demand democratic capitalism, it is realistic 
to believe that they would benefit from a system in which they have equal 
opportunities to realize their individual talents and profit from careers 
independent of the government. 




The Cuban government must drastically change its approach towards 
struggling entrepreneurs seeking to improve their stagnant economic position. 
A more open-minded government must foster creativity and support
entrepreneurial endeavors that will benefit consumers and producers of 
goods alike. According to a leading article about the Cuban economy, the 
political viewpoints of the emerging Cuban middle classes will depend on 
the government being receptive to entrepreneurial private interests.147 If
the government continues supporting a closed system, unrest and conflict 
will continue to mount. On the other hand, an open willingness to share 
power and resources would foster a more level playing field in Cuba
conducive to a more hopeful and encouraging economic future.148 
A foreseeable problem facing American companies wishing to kick start
commerce with Cuba is the stark contrast of the capitalistic foundations of
these companies and the socialist framework of the country with which
they wish to engage. Doing business in Cuba will involve significant
challenges because the Cuban Government has control over virtually all 
certainly auger positive change in the years to come.”  Johanna Mendelson Forman, Cuba’s 
Emerging Middle Class and Growing Private Sector, THE HUFFINGTON POST (2013), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/12/cuba-middle-class_n_4260021.html. 
147. Feinberg, supra note 142. 
148. 	Id. at 45. 
To help promote private business in Cuba, the President should authorize U.S. 
firms and individuals to engage in commerce in goods and services with independent
entrepreneurs in Cuba, and to provide financial and technical assistance to them. 
U.S. exports would enable Cuban entrepreneurs to access badly needed machinery 
and other supplies and U.S. creditors would fill the capital gap. U.S. importers
would broaden the consumer base for Cuban producers. 
Id. at 53. 
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business enterprises.149 It is unlikely that the Government, under the Castro
regime, would relinquish any control; if anything, the Government would
be skeptical and overly involved in American intrusion into the Cuban
economy.150 The Cuban market remains controlled by international private
ventures with the Cuban government in which the government seeks a 51 
percent ownership stake.151 
The notion that the Cuban government would act as a joint business 
partner may dissuade companies from engaging with Cuba at all. Since 
American companies will likely need to collaborate with the government,
they must be cautious of heightened liability that looms large in conducting
business with a corrupt government. American companies seeking contractual
arrangements with Cuban officials must be aware of the possibility that
illegal payments will be requested.152 
A recent reminder of the corruption in Cuba is the anti-corruption bust 
that led to the arrest of a Canadian businessman in 2011, who was later
sentenced to 15 years on bribery charges.153 Cuban officials also arrested 
two other employees from the company and seized the company’s Cuban 
assets, which were worth nearly $100 million.154 This ordeal serves as a
 149. See Timothy Belevetz & Ronald Oleynik, A Warning on Doing Business in 
Cuba, CNBC (July 30, 2015, 11:09 A.M.), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/30/a-warning­
on-doing-business-in-cuba-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/Q6B5-UT6G].
150. Id.
 151. See Jason Ankeny, The Challenges of Doing Business in Cuba, ENTREPRENEUR
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252795 [https://perma.cc/QL8C­
B79D]. “Cuban government is unwilling to bend its existing rules for conducting business. 
Under those rules, a foreign business must partner with the government and most likely
agree to be represented by a state-owned law firm.” Mike Coates, What You Need to Know
if You’re Considering Doing Business in Cuba, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2015/11/19/what-you-need-to-know-if-youre­
considering-doing-business-in-cuba/#e477e1320e37. 
152. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE U.S.
EMBARGO 2 (2001), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tab4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XAJ-YM2X]. “In this type of environment, a bribe paid to an official 
to obtain commercial benefits may be less likely to be discovered and disclosed but is no
less illegal, at least under U.S. law.” Belevetz & Oleynik, supra note 149. 
153.   Daniel Trotta, Cuba frees Canadian businessman Tokmakjian after three years 
in jail, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-corruption­
canada-idUSKBN0LP0QA20150222 [https://perma.cc/X8Z4-BZBA]. Canadian transport 
executive, Cy Tokmakjian, was released after serving 3 years without any reason given by
the Cuban government for his release. Id.
154.  “Fourteen Cubans, including two high-ranking officials, were also convicted 
and sentenced in connection with the bribery charges.” Daniel Trotta, Cuba sentences 
Canadian CEO to 15 years on financial charges, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2014, 9:15 PM), 
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cautionary reminder to American business owners seeking to venture into 
Cuba to expand their investments. 
Since the state runs virtually all significant business enterprises, it raises
the possibility that any payment of a bribe related to not only traditional
government functions, such as permitting, licensing, and government 
contracting, but also to business deals that in other places would be wholly
between private parties will be a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA).155 
The FCPA also requires U.S. companies adhere to precise book and
record keeping provisions and adopt an adequate system of financial and
accounting controls that are enforced subject to Department of Justice and
Securities and Exchange Commission standards.156 American companies
that are engaged in trade with Cuba must maintain close supervision of 
interactions with Cuban officials, and employ compliance safeguards to
regularly audit before, during, and after the execution of any contract or
business transaction.157 Opening the door to trade with Cuba should provide 
U.S. businesses with new and profitable opportunities, but it also presents
significant risks and liabilities for corruption and bribery that can be at 
least partially curbed with attention to detail. 




Economic sanctions, such as the calculated withdrawal of U.S. trade or 
financial relations regarding Cuba, exemplify the controversial foreign policy 
tool known as an embargo that governments utilize to change behaviors 
of the target country or punish them by damaging their economy.158 Given 
the political landscape and current state of international affairs, economic
sanctions are no longer effective tools that instigate change. According to
a report by the Peterson Institute for Internal Economics, the success rate 
of such sanctions is dependent on the type of policy or governmental 
change sought.159 Economic constraints sanctioned to effectuate relatively
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-corruption-idUSKCN0HM0PW20140928 [https:// 
perma.cc/R9WN-547Z].
155. The FCPA makes it illegal to pay an official of a foreign government, or any
“instrumentality” thereof, to obtain a business benefit. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
156. See generally id.
157. Companies cannot shield themselves by having third parties pay their bribes, 
therefore, businesses must implement compliance programs the tightly monitor all third-
party intermediaries as well as payments made by all business partners in order to safeguard 
their investments in Cuba. See id.   Feinberg, supra note 142. 
158. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 1 (3d ed. 2007). 
159. Id. at 158. 
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small and limited goals, such as the release of a political prisoner, succeed
half the time.160 When economic sanctions are used to accelerate entire
political regime changes (e.g., by destabilizing a particular leader or by 
ousting a dictator), changing a country’s policies in a major way, the sanctions 
succeed in roughly 30 percent of attempts.161 
All economic sanctions and results of the Embargo are facing an uphill 
battle in which the Castro regime has undeniably become stronger and more 
assertive towards their people as the restrictions increase.162 The Embargo 
and the Helms-Burton Act aim to provoke major change and political 
revolution in Cuba, but their means of achieving such a significant goal 
have been, and will continue to be, ineffective due to the unintended
benefactors of more stringent sanctions—the leaders of the Castro regime.
There is a double standard in our government in which past administrations
routinely opposed efforts in Congress to impose trade sanctions against 
countries like China because of its poor human rights record, yet renewed
the sanctions against Cuba each year.163 However, China has become one
of the United States’ largest and most trusted trade partners while the
government has maintained a debilitating embargo on nearly all facets of
the Cuban economy.164 It has been widely accepted that maintaining an
economic relationship with China offers the most realistic means for
inspiring political and human rights reform, but this rationale has not been
applied to Cuba.165  In fact, the restrictions that were codified as the Helms-
Burton Act will likely remain in effect as long as Congressional approval 
160. Id. at 141. “Sanctions now are often deployed in settings where central
government authority is fragile or fragmented.” The Embargo against Cuba was created to 
put pressure on the Castro regime and effectuate political change of an entire country, a 
huge goal. At the same time, the central government controls the means of production in
every facet of the economy and is a strong autocratic dictatorship rather than a divided 
regime. It is no wonder that change is unlikely to occur after such a long period of the 
status quo under the Helms-Burton restrictions. See id. at 146–47. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Griswold, supra note 51. The Chinese government has jailed and killed far more 
political and religious dissenters than the Cuban government has. China’s resources, 
communist history, and access to nuclear weapons make it a country of greater concern
from a national security standpoint than Cuba. China’s economic influence and power as 
a world leader with many alliances make it difficult to sanction without disrupting
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is needed to repeal the Act.166 Foreign policy is in this area is disjointed, 
as highlighted by the fact that economic sanctions appear to be hindering 
the large regime overhaul needed in Cuba. 
In a speech on trade early in his first term, President George W. Bush 
noted that, 
Trade creates the habits of freedom, to create the expectations of democracy and
demands for better democratic institutions. Societies that open to commerce across
their borders are more open to democracy within their borders. And for those of 
us who care about values and believe in values—not just American values, but 
universal values that promote human dignity—trade is a good way to do that.167 
Unrestricted trade and globalization foster democracy, and countries like 
Cuba, when exposed to a free market economy after years of being oppressed 
under an authoritarian system, are prime candidates to thrive under democratic 
conditions where they have greater opportunity and human rights protection.168 
Development may also help to solidify a larger middle class in Cuba that 
can support and influence their system of government, fulfilling the intended
goals of the Cuban Embargo.
The Embargo has completely failed to achieve any of its main objectives. 
It has not changed the course or nature of the Cuban government, nor has 
it liberated a single Cuban citizen.169 Director of the Center for Trade Policy
Studies at the Cato Institute, Daniel Griswold has stated, 
The Embargo has made the Cuban people a bit more impoverished, without making 
them one bit more free. At the same time, it has deprived Americans of their
freedom to travel and has cost US farmers and other producers billions of dollars
of potential exports.170 
166. Cuba is not the only example of American failures to implement economic 
sanctions. Sanctions against Burma, Iran, and North Korea have been largely ineffective 
at creating any change and the oppressive regimes in power have been largely unchanged. 
However, economic sanctions in these instances have had the side effect of injuring and 
impoverishing the destitute and contributing to the poverty rate in the target country. See 
id.
 167. Id.
168. Furthermore, access to the free trade of goods speeds up development and gives
citizens access to resources that encourage freethinking and the spread of information.
Telephones, satellite television, fax machines, and Internet access undermine oppressive 
and authorization influence. See generally id. 
169. The U.S. objective in Cuba was to eventually liberate the people of Cuba from 
the Castro regime and give them hope for a better, democratic future. This objective has
undoubtedly failed in most aspects and the economic repercussions of the Embargo was 
to further deprive the Cuban people of low-cost, affordable food and commodities that but
for the Embargo, could have been bought for cheaper and more competitive prices directly
from the U.S. See Griswold, supra note 24. 
170. Id.
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The failure of the Embargo has been exacerbated by its accompanying 
legislation, the Helms-Burton Act. The Act presents an unworkable model
that leaves no real opportunity to bring change to Cuba because it eliminates 
the Executive Branch’s authority to end the Embargo.171 
The President will likely not take action to subvert the Congressional
approval needed to repeal the Helms-Burton Act. Things will stay as they
are unless Congress decides to repeal the Act, which is unlikely considering 
the inadequate amount of bipartisan cooperation in the legislature.  However,
an additional solution remains, if the Constitutional separation of powers 
issue is raised before the Supreme Court of the United States. Considering 
that there is sufficient standing, and accompanying procedural guidelines 
are met, the Supreme Court would have the authority to decide this issue 
and potentially vest the power to terminate the Embargo with the President, 
not members of Congress. 
A potential impediment to having the Supreme Court resolve the separation
of powers issue is that the Court has the power to defer answering the
question to another branch of government. The Court does this by determining 
that the issue is a political question, which is fundamentally non-justiciable
as a legal issue.172 The Court can essentially refuse to consider this question 
and would likely leave it for the Legislative Branch (Congress) to decide.
At that point, Congress would be hesitant to relinquish their control over
Cuba granted to them by the Helms-Burton Act, and consequently, the 
issue would not be resolved. 
Unfortunately, the economic Embargo against Cuba has for decades
been justified on thinly veiled policies and outdated legislation and is unlikely
to be repealed.173 The political barriers to terminating the Embargo need
not completely stall relations and a symbiotic trading relationship. The 
Embargo costs the U.S. economy between $1.2 and 4.84 billion annually 
171.  22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091 (2016). 
172. The political question doctrine reflects the Supreme Court’s decision to avoid 
inserting itself into conflicts between branches of government, which is precisely what 
needs to be done in order to resolve the separation of powers injustice resulting from the 
Helms-Burton transferring authority to terminate the Embargo to Congress. See John E. 
Finn, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, lecture in Civil Liberties and the Bill
of Rights, TEACHING CO. (2016), http://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/civil-liberties­
and-the-bill-of-rights.html [https://perma.cc/Q9P3-WGKF]. 
173. The Embargo is still justified by the TWEA, even though officials have stated 
that Cuba is no longer seen as a threat to national security and does not fall under the definition
of an “enemy.” See Harris, supra note 29. 
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in lost sales and exports, while Cuba has calculated the total costs throughout 
the entire Embargo at over $1 trillion.174 
The manner in which the Helms-Burton Act was drafted still allows for 
real change and progress to be made through Executive Action that is not
specifically forbidden. The numerous sanctions against Cuba and laws 
that govern U.S.—Cuba relations can be somewhat neutralized in order to 
give Cubans the necessities of daily life and help provide them with resources 
they would otherwise be without. This kind of assistance would improve 
the image of the U.S. in the eyes of Cubans as well as the international 
community, which has routinely rejected the Embargo without enforcing 
any punishments on the U.S.175 While the Helms-Burton Act is outdated 
and ineffective, American efforts to improve relations with Cuba need not
be. 
Generally, as a foreign policy measure, economic sanctions tend to damage
American economic interests over time without improving or modifying
the target country’s behavior in any substantial manner.176 Presently, with 
such a globalized world economy, unilateral sanctions harm American
firms disproportionately compared to those of the target country, which can 
usually find substitute sources of supply and financing from other members 
of the international community.177  This result is evident in Cuba, where other
countries have continued to trade with Cuba to meet their demand for 
products.
While relatively few American agricultural producers have profited
from exporting their goods to Cuba, there are many other industries and
 174. See Margot Pepper, The Cost of the Embargo, DOLLARS & SENSE (Feb. 28, 
2016), http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2009/0309pepper.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KMY6-N28Q]; Portia Siegelbaum, Cuba: U.S. Embargo Causes $1 Trillion in Losses,
CBS NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuba-us-embargo-causes-1­
trillion-in-losses/.
175. In a speech given to the U.N. delegates before the annual vote on the Embargo, 
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla stated, “The blockade is a flagrant, 
massive and systematic violation of the human rights of all Cubans; it is contrary to
International Law; it has been described as a crime of genocide.” Still, there has not been
any action to punish the U.S. or bring about any real change to lift the Embargo for good.
Elise Labott & Richard Roth, U.N. overwhelmingly rejects U.S. embargo of Cuba, CNN
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/politics/un-vote-cuba-embargo/ [https://perma.cc/
YWL3-YCXN].
176. Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (June 1998), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1998/06/sanctions­
haass [https://perma.cc/Y56C-LYLX]. 
177.  Furthermore, American interests are harmed indirectly because when discouraging
other free countries to trade with the target country, U.S. foreign policy can be undermined 
if they decide to engage in trade despite sanctions, leading to even further conflict. Third-
party countries that violate the terms of U.S. sanctions are unnecessarily labeled and treated
unfavorably and even draw attention away from the original intent of the sanctions on the
target. See id.
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businesses that would likely thrive if given the opportunity to compete in
Cuba. These areas, ranging from telecommunications, auto, and hospitality
industries, would provide beneficial services to deprived Cubans, while 
making a profit. Free market proponents and the international community
would have to acknowledge progress and the regression of the terms of
the Embargo. Continued legislation and circumvention of the Helms-Burton
Act through executive action may be the most effective solution to help
both countries prosper and restoring an overdue sense of international 
tranquility.
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